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The public filing of a certificate of incorporation that contains
a corporate purpose clause is mandated by statute in forty-eight
states and in the District of Columbia.1 This Article examines the
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1 State statutes that mandate the public filing of a corporate purpose clause fall into
three different categories. In the first category, fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and
the 1960 versions of the Model Business Corporation Act require that the articles of incorporation set forth the purpose or purposes for which a corporation is being formed. See
ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.255(a)(3) (1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-502(C) (1980); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 29-921a(c) (West 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(a)(4) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.47(e) (Smith-Hurd 1954); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-104(a)(3) (1975);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(a)(3) (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-105(c)
(1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.055(8) (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-53(3)
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1-208(a)(4) (West Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-730(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODiFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-5(3) (1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-202(e)(i) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49(c) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
1926(3) (1973); MODEL BusmEss CORP. AcT § 48(c) (1960).
In the second category, thirty states and the 1971 version of the Model Business Corporation Act require that the articles of incorporation set forth a corporate purpose, yet permit
the corporation to state that such purpose is to engage in or to include any lawful act or
activities for which corporations may be organized under the given statutory charter. See
ALA. CODE § 10-2A-91(a)(3) (1980); Anz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(3) (1977); COLO. Rv.
STAT. § 7-2-102(1)(c) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-290(a)(2) (West Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(a)(3) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.007 (West 1977);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-11(4) (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(c) (1980); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 496A.49(3) (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(a)(3) (1975); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 271A.270(1)(c) (1981); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(B)(2) (West 1969); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-202(1)(c) (1983); Nan. REv. STAT. § 21-2052(3) (1977); NEv. REv. STAT. §
78.035(3) (1981); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(I)(c) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:27(1)(b) (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(A)(3) (Supp. 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 402(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(3) (1982); Omo Rav. CODE
ANN. § 1701.04(A)(3) (Page 1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 57.311(1)(c) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1204(A)(3)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(c) (Supp. 1983); TEx.
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 3.02(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 13.1-49(b) (1978);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.12.020(3) (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-27(a)(3) (1982);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.45(1)(c) (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-202(a)(iii) (1977); MODEL
BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 54(c) (1971). Michigan permits all corporations, except those formed
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reasons commonly offered for the inclusion of a purpose clause in
the certificate of incorporation, and suggests that, although a corporation should be allowed to insert such a clause in its bylaws,
compulsory inclusion of a purpose clause in the certificate or in the
articles of incorporation is no longer justified.
In effect, the purpose clause lost much of its importance over
the last half-century with the eclipse of the ultra vires doctrine.2
The purpose clause now serves to define the scope of management's authority rather than the corporation's capacity. To the extent that shareholders would like to limit the scope of manage-

ment's authority and thereby limit corporate activities, they may
include such restrictions in the bylaws or amend the bylaws to in-

clude such restrictions.' While bylaws are not filed publicly,4 they
guide corporate management and are regarded as a contract between the shareholders and the corporation.5 My proposal, then,
does not adversely affect the viability of the purpose clause as a
control device for the protection of the interests of minority or
non-officer shareholders in the closely held corporation.
The requirement that corporate purposes be stated in the certificate or articles of incorporation, thus ensuring access for public
inspection, traditionally has been justified as necessary to advance
four separate interests: 1) the interest of a third party in determining whether a potential contract or transaction with a corporation
for an educational purpose, to use a broad purpose clause. MICH. Com. LAWS ANN. §

450.1202(b) (West 1973). Indiana does not expressly require the certificate to include a purpose clause, but permits all but a few specified kinds of corporations to be "organized...
for any lawful business purpose or purposes. . . ." IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-2-1 (Burns 1984).
Maine and Minnesota do not require any mention of purpose within the articles of
incorporation. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN.tit. 13-A, § 404(1)-(2) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.§
302A.101 (West Special Pamphlet 1984). The California statute combines aspects of the
second and third statutory forms, requiring that the articles include the phrase "[t]he purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act," and that "[t]he articles shall not set
forth any further or additional statement with respect to the purposes or powers of the
corporation, except by way of limitation ... " CAL. CORP.CODE § 202(b)(1)(i), (b)(3) (West
Supp. 1984).
S See infra text accompanying notes 9-15.
8 This assumes that the power to alter, amend

or repeal such bylaws, or adopt a new
purpose clause in the bylaws, is vested in the shareholders unless reserved to the board by
the articles of incorporation.
4 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 4173

(penn. ed.).

'Appeal of Two Crow Ranch, Inc., 159 Mont. 16, 494 P.2d 915 (1972); Papalexiou v.
Tower West Condominiums, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979); OLeary v.
Board of Directors, 89 Wis. 2d 156, 278 N.W.2d 217 (1979); 8 W. FyxcrmR, supra note 4, §
1466 (perm. ed.); see also M. ScHAEFrLF-, THE LnrmiEs OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INsURANcE OF CORPORTE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 122-23 (1976).
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is within the scope of the corporation's authority; 2) management's
interest in ascertaining the lines of business in which the corporation is authorized to engage; 3) an investor's interest in knowing
the kind of business in which he will be investing; and 4) the
state's interests in overseeing corporate activity and consumer
protection.'
The interest of third parties in a publicly filed purpose clause
is interrelated with the ultra vires doctrine. The ultra vires doctrine provides that a corporation may perform only those legal acts
that are within the purposes or powers conferred upon it by statute or by certificate of incorporation.7 An attempt by a corporation
to act beyond its purposes or powers is considered to be an ultra
vires activity and, in the past, was not legally binding, since
neither the corporation nor the third party could enforce an ultra
vires contract in court.8 The consequence of the doctrine was justified, in part, by the purpose clause requirement. The common law
charged a party dealing with a corporation with knowledge of the
contents of the publicly filed certificate of incorporation, including
the purpose clause, regardless of whether the party actually examined the certificate. 9 The ultra vires doctrine was widely criticized because of its reliance on such constructive notice; it was
thought to be impractical and unreasonable to expect third parties
to examine the certificate of incorporation of every corporation
with which a business transaction was contemplated.' 0 Consequently, the constructive notice doctrine has been abandoned." It
8

See 5 Z.

-15 (1983); N.

CAVITCH, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS

LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

WITH TAX PLANNING § 101.01, at 101-14 to
§ 62, at 201-03 (2d ed. 1971); R. STEVENS,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 47, at 231-32 (2d ed. 1949).
See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

39 (5th
ed. 1980). For a detailed comparison of various definitions of the ultra vires, see Schaeftler,
Ultra Vires-Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business
Corporations,9 J. CORP. L. 81, 81 n.2 (1983).
8 Schaeftler, supra note 7, at 82 & n.3.
' See H. BALLANTINE, ON CORPORATIONS § 99, at 253-55 (1946). For a more detailed
treatment of the constructive notice doctrine and its history, see id.; Brimble, Ultra Vires
Under the Texas Business CorporationAct, 40 TEx. L. REv. 677, 688-89 (1962); Ham, Ultra
Vires Contracts Under Modern CorporateLegislation, 46 Ky. L.J. 215, 222-23 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?,33 YALE L.J.
49, 6263 (1923).
'2 See, e.g., 7A W. FLErCHR, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3426,
at 40-41 (rev. perm. ed. 1978); Ham, supra note 9, at 224-25; Note, Powers-Ultra
Vires-Problems Remaining After Legislative and JudicialModification of the Doctrine,
34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 99, 99 (1958). At least one jurisdiction has abolished the constructive
notice doctrine by statute. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.08(B) (Page 1978).
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follows that mere inclusion of a purpose clause in the certificate no
longer provides a sufficient basis for charging the public with notice of a corporation's limitations.
Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions has
enacted statutes that, for the most part, preclude invocation of the
ultra vires defense in dealings between corporations and third parties.112 These statutory provisions typically state that the ultra vires
defense may be raised only in limited circumstances, such as in a
proceeding by a shareholder to enjoin the performance of an ultra
vires executory contract, in a derivative action against the executive responsible for the ultra vires activity, or in a quo warranto
proceeding by the state to dissolve a corporation or to enjoin it
from entering into an ultra vires transaction. 3 Since the rights of a
third party under a consummated ultra vires transaction are no
longer affected, potential third parties have even less incentive
than they formerly had to ascertain the permissible scope of corpo12 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutory solutions to
the ultra vires problem that either are identical to or comparable with § 7 of the Model
Business Corporation Act. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-24 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.018
(1968); ARmi.REv. STAT. ANN.§ 10-007 (1977); ARm STAT. ANN.§ 64-106 (1980); COLO.Rzy.
STAT. § 7-3-105 (1974); CONN. GEE. STAT. ANN. § 33-292 (West 1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 124 (1983); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 29-905 (West 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.021 (West
1977); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-2-22 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-7 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.8 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-4 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §
496A.6 (West 1962); KAN. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17-6104 (Vernon 1975); Ky. Rzv. STAT.
271A.035 (1981); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12:42 (West 1969); ME.Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §
203 (1981); MD. CoRpS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 1-403 (1975); MICH. CoMn. LAws ANN. §
450.1271 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.165 (West Special Pamphlet 1984); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-3-11 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. 351.395 (Vernon 1966); MONT.CODE ANN.§ 351-110 (1983); NEB. REy. STAT. § 21-2006 (1977); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 293.A-7 (Supp.
1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-2 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-6 (Supp. 1983); N.Y.
Bus. CORP.LAW § 203 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-19-6 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.040 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (Purdon
1967); R.L GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-6 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 33-3-30 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D.
CODInID LAws ANN.§§ 47-2-60 to -2-63 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-405 (1979); Tax. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN.art. 2.04 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-6 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit 11, § 1854 (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-5 (1978); WASH. RED. CODE § 23A.08.040 (1974); W.
VA. CODE § 31-1-10 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.06 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-106
(1983).
Five other states, while not using the approach of the Model Business Corporation Act,
have adopted statutes that change the common law. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 208 (West
1977); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 155, § 11 (West 1970); NEv. REy. STAT. § 78.135(3) (1981);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (Page 1978); OKLA.STAT. ANN.tit. 18, § 1.18 (West 1953).
Hawaii is the only state that has retained and, in fact, codified the common-law doctrine.
See HAwAI REv. STAT. § 416-31 to -32 (1976).
'3 E.g., MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7 (1971).
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rate activity. 14 Accordingly, the "notice to third parties" rationale
no longer supports the public filing requirement.
Arguably, a third party may still wish to examine the purpose
clause in order to avoid the risk that the transaction will be enjoined by a shareholder at the executory stage. There is little evidence, however, that this risk is more than minimal. In the past 20
years, only four reported cases involved attempts by shareholders
to enjoin ultra vires activities. 1 5 The plaintiff was successful in only
14

Under the statutory provisions precluding the use of ultra vires by a third party, it

remains possible for a court to enjoin performance of a third party's contract with a corporation at the request of a shareholder or at the request of the state. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 124 (1983); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 450.1271 (West 1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw § 203 (McKinney 1983); MODEL BusNEsS CORP. AcT § 7 (1971). To this extent, a third
party's ignorance of the permissible range of corporate purposes could operate to his detriment. See R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS 133 n.1 (5th ed. 1979). For a proposal
to eliminate shareholder's standing to enjoin ultra vires executory contracts, see Schaeftler,
Clearing Away the Debris of the Ultra Vires Doctrine-A Comparative Examination of
U.S., European and IsraeliLaw, LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. , (1984). For a proposal to eliminate state standing to enjoin otherwise lawful ultra vires acts, see Schaeftler, supra note 7,
at 91-93.
15 Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Dollar Land Corp., 44 App. Div. 2d 445, 447-48, 355
N.Y.S.2d 409, 411-12 (1st Dep't 1974) (noting prior unreported action validating ultra vires
agreement despite grant of preliminary injunction); Goodma v. Ladd Estate Co., 246 Or.
621, 623, 427 P.2d 102, 103-04 (1967) (denial of injunction to bar enforcement of admitted
ultra vires guarantee agreement); Diamond Paint Co. v. Embry, 525 S.W.2d 529, 537 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (injunction denied on ground that enforcement of ultra vires contract is
inequitable); Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578, 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(minority shareholder permitted to intervene in action to enjoin payment of note issued to
satisfy personal obligation of corporation president).
It is evident that actions to enjoin ultra vires activities are infrequent for the following
reasons: 1) the potential threat of injunction exists only when the third party enters into a
transaction with a limited-purpose corporation, a rare occurrence in the modem business
world; 2) the scope of the transaction entered into by the management of the limited-purpose corporation must exceed that permitted by the corporation's purpose clause, an equally
rare occurrence; 3) the likelihood that a non-controlling shareholder would detect that a
transaction is ultra vires while the transaction is executory is rather slim; 4) a shareholder is
likely to be deterred from seeking an injunction by the inconvenience and expense involved;
5) the ultra vires transaction probably would have to be unprofitable for the corporation, or
at least thought to be unprofitable by the complaining shareholder, since it is unlikely that a
shareholder would act contrary to his own immediate pecuniary interests; and 6) a majority
of the shareholders could amend the purpose clause in the articles of incorporation to transform the ultra vires activity into a legitimate one, leading to a dismissal of pending injunction proceedings or to annulment of an injunction already granted.
The possibility of state interference with a contract involving a corporation also is minimal. A recent survey of state attorneys general and secretaries of state indicates that during
the past decade, ten actions, at most, have been brought by a state to enjoin an ultra vires
act or to dissolve a corporation for engaging is such activity. See Schaeftler, supra note 7, at
90-91 & nn. 37-38.
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one of these cases."' In any event, the elimination of the need publicly to file a purpose clause would not prevent a third party who
desires to know the limitations of the corporation's authority to act
from requesting a copy of the corporate bylaws from the corporation's office. If the corporation refuses to comply with this request,
then the third party would have reason to conclude that the corporation has something to hide, and might well decide not to deal
with the corporation. Moreover, as a practical matter, a party dealing with a corporation in the present business and legal environment does not independently examine the corporate purpose
clause. Rather, a third party relies on a legal opinion issued by the
corporation's counsel, based on a study of the relevant law and corporate documents, that informs him that the company has the authority to enter into the desired transaction.
Since the demise of the ultra vires doctrine, the purpose clause
ostensibly now serves to define the scope of management's authority rather than corporate capacity. Nevertheless, the relationship
between corporate management's desire to discern the extent of its
authority and the existence of a publicly filed purpose clause is
tenuous at best. It is unrealistic to assume that corporate management either refers to, or is guided by, the corporation's purpose
clause. To the extent that management needs to ascertain the
boundaries of its authority, it may readily do so by examining
available copies of the corporation's articles and bylaws, as well as
any applicable statutes. Although bylaws are not filed publicly, '7
they are regarded as a contract between the shareholders and the
corporation, and guide corporate management in carrying out its
responsibilities.1 ' The argument that a corporation that delineates
its corporate purpose must rely on publicly filed information to
guide its management is akin to the assertion that a coach reads
his pre-game comment in the newspapers to know how to direct
his team during the course of the game. In short, public filing of
the corporation's purpose clause cannot be justified on the ground
" Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578, 591 (TeL Civ. App. 1966).
11 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 4173, at 608-09 (rev. perm. ed. 1982); G. SEWARD,

BAsic CORPORP ATE
PRACrCE 51 (1966).

" See, e.g., Appeal of the Two Crow Ranch, Inc., 51 Mont. 16, 21, 494 P.2d 915, 919

(1972); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 531, 401 A.2d 280, 287
(Ch. Div. 1979); O'Leary v. Board of Directors, 89 Wis. 2d 156, 169, 278 N.W.2d 217, 222
(1979); 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 4166, at 592 (rev. perm. ed. 1982); see also M.
ScHmq'YA THE LIe-mrrms oF OFFicE: INDEMNFCATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFIcns AND DmECTORs 122-23 (1976) (bylaws characterized as statutory contract).
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that it serves to inform management of the scope of management's
authority.
Public filing of the purpose clause also has been justified on
the ground that it gives potential investors notice of the scope of
management's authority to use funds invested in the company.
Yet, if a potential stockholder wishes to know the range of permissible activities of the corporation, either he or the selling shareholder can contact the office of the corporation and request a copy
of the corporate bylaws as could any other interested third party.
Furthermore, typical investors in medium and large corporations
do not rely on, or even examine, the purpose clause prior to making a decision to invest in the corporation. These investors usually
investigate the industry or line of business in which the corporation is actively involved. Such information obviously cannot be
gathered from the certificate's purpose clause, since the purpose
clause delineates all permissible activities that the corporation may
engage in rather than the specific ventures and businesses it in fact
is pursuing.
Finally, the state historically has had an interest in ensuring
that "an enterprise it had chartered [does] not become perverted
to other ends." 19 Two legislative developments in the 20th century,
however, illustrate the diminishment of this state interest, and
thus have led to the decline in the role of the purpose clause in
general. First, restrictions on the number and kind of purposes for
which a business may be incorporated have disappeared. This development is exemplified by state statutory provisions based on
section 54(c) of the Model Business Corporation Act, which permits the certificate of incorporation merely to state that the corporation may engage in "any lawful business. ' 20 A recent survey
19

D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 168 (lst ed. 1973). The concept that a state has

an interest in preventing a corporation that it has chartered from engaging in illegal or
improper activities is related to the state concession theory of corporate existence. See
Schaeftler, supra note 7, at 87. Under this theory, a corporation's capacity is limited to
those powers granted to it by the sovereign, since it had been, and could only have been,
created by affirmative act of the sovereign. Id.; see Holdsworth, English CorporationLaw in
the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 382, 385-94 (1922) (tracing development of the
concession theory in early English common law). In the late 19th century, this method of
granting corporate charters gave way to incorporation under general incorporation acts, in
which initial restrictions on corporate purpose were short lived. See Schaeftler, supra note
7, at 87-88.
20 See MODEL Busmnas CORP. ACT § 54(c) (1971). Section 54 of the Model Business
Corporation Act states that:
The articles of incorporation shall set forth:
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demonstrated conclusively that the overwhelming majority of corporations in most states, particularly medium and large-sized corporations, has adopted broad, boilerplate purpose clauses or, where
available, an "any lawful purpose" clause. 21 The liberalization of
c) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized which may be
stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful business for which
corporations may be incorporated under this Act.
Id.; see supra note 1.
2, The author conducted a survey in the following manner to determine the popularity
of broad purpose clauses. A questionnaire was sent to the Secretary of State of each state. It
requested a true or false answer to each of the following four statements, as well as specification of the percentage of the state's corporations to which each statement applied:
1. Most of the articles of incorporation in your file contain permissive boilerplate language describing the purposes of the company or an "any lawful activity" purpose clause.
2. To the extent that the articles of incorporation contain a limited purpose clause,
they were fied by relatively small corporations.
3. The overwhelming majority of certificates of incorporation filed with your office during the last decade include a very broad purpose clause.
4. Large corporations (more than $1 million in assets and at least 100 shareholders)
almost always contain a very broad purpose clause.
Forty-three states responded to the questionnaire. The answers to questions one and
three in the questionnaire reflected the opinions and best estimates of those individuals in
the Secretary of State offices who were responsible for reviewing articles of incorporation
filed with their office prior to issuance of a certificate of incorporation. Three of the states
provided inconclusive information. Approximately one-third of the states were not prepared
to respond to questions two and four, since they were unable to differentiate among corporations with large or small numbers of shareholders or assets. Twenty-nine officials answered
question two based upon a "gut" impression, while twenty-seven did the same for question
four.
Although no accurate information was available regarding the total number of business
corporations currently active in each state, dates on the number of new incorporations in
each state can be found in a publication of the United States Bureau of Census. See U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE AND MEmopoLrrAN AREA DATA BOOK 519 (1982). In 1980, 10
states comprised 59.6% of all new incorporations, and 20 states comprised 78.1% of all new
incorporations. Id. A correlation between the number of new corporations in each of the top
10 and 20 states and the total number of corporations in each grouping is assumed.
Results:
Question 1: Thirty-two states supported the statement that most articles of incorporation in their files contain a broad boilerplate purpose clause or an "any lawful purpose"
provision. All of the top 10 corporate states and 15 out of the 17 responses received from the
top 20 states supported this statement. Of the remaining top 20 states, one response was
indecisive and another indicated that the number of corporations with broad purpose
clauses is about the same as the number of corporations with limited purpose clauses.
Question 2: Twenty-four out of the twenty-nine states responding to this question
agreed that most articles of incorporation containing a limited purpose clause were filed by
relatively small corporations. Nine responses from the top 20 corporate states supported this
statement and one disagreed. The majority of these small corporations may well be professional corporations, which are required by statute to have a specific purpose clause. E.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1503(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
Question 3: Thirty-two states agreed that the overwhelming majority of certificates of
incorporations filed in the last decade included a very broad purpose clause.'Fourteen out of
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purpose clauses and the growing popularity of "any lawful activity" pufrpose clauses undercut the rationale for state control over
corporate purposes. The second legislative development has been
the grant of authority to amend the purpose clause. 22 This development has vitiated further the state's interest in preventing a corporation from engaging in activities beyond its stated purpose,
since the purpose clause can be altered at anytime by the unilateral act of the corporation to reflect the corporation's actual
activities.
It may be contended that the elimination of a public filing requirement would create a fundamental danger that the incorporators may choose to engage in illegal activity, conduct a business
that is highly regulated, or embark on a venture requiring special
state attention.23 In the absence of a publicly filed purpose clause,
the state would not be informed of such activities, and hence
would be unable to prohibit or oversee them. It is unlikely, however, that those intending to engage in illegal activities would inform the state of their plans by describing such activities in the
purpose clause. Thus, it is doubtful that state agencies could utilize the corporate purpose clause to weed out illegal practices. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of corporations, particularly those engaged in regulated activities such as insurance and
banking, incorporates with the aid of legal counsel substantially
reduces the risk either of incorporation for illegal purposes or of
failure to obtain required prior consent of a state agency.

17 responses received from the top 20 corporate states supported the same statement. Two

of the top 20 states indicated that 50% of the recently filed certificates contain a broad
purpose clause, and one state provided an inconclusive response.
Question 4: Twenty-three state officials agreed that large corporations are unlikely to
use limited purpose clauses in their certificates of incorporation. Only four states disagreed
with this statement. Eight out of the top 20 corporate states responded to question four and
all of those states supported the statement.
The attached table summarizes each state's responses to the author's questionnaire:
SEE TABLE ON NEXT TWO PAGES
22 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(2) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 801(b)(2)
(McKinney 1963); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 58(c) (1971); see also Note, Amending the Articles of Incorporation,15 S.C.L. REv. 506, 538 (1963) ("generally recognized charter amendments include [those] ... enlarging or limiting the corporate purpose").
23 See, e.g., 5 Z. CAVITCH, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS wITH TAX PLANNING § 101.01, at 10115 (1983) (corporate purpose clause useful in determining "whether the corporation ha[d]
been organized for a lawful purpose"); 1 S. FLANAGAN, FLETcHER CORPORATION FORMS ANNOTATED § 268 (4th ed. 1981) (purpose clause requirement enables state to ascertain whether
corporation is governed by special statute).

PURPOSE CLAUSE

1984]

t-o

L~o -,- o

w

00

Xl

co0 co

t

fiXm

frD

o

0
00
Q)

Ci

o

o

0

o8
ass

0)

-

fIt

A

AA
A

uE

tofr
A
E

X

A0

X

__

__

0 0

X

fiX

o°C

0

02

N.

ol o
t-

to

co
0
2-4

0
CoJ

0)
'-4

zoo
4 -

- -

omq co ,-I I o
"

m

CD)

40

,mq

~~ ~ ~
2-

gr
co '00
0 "

o

C
00.4'4~-

mO
I ci 10 '-4
06 00CO1001 0

f

[Vol. 58:476

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

x

x. >4

x~x
~i

~

fL

-----------------------------------

ixi

c

_

-

z-

oci 1R.i

-tfr

w

_

_i

_iC

_i

'

-I

i

_

----------

_

1984]

PURPOSE CLAUSE

It also has been suggested that the elimination of public filing
of the purpose clause will adversely affect third parties whose concern for the public interest in preventing corporations from engaging in illegal activity occasionally prompts them to examine corporate purpose clauses.24 Newspapers, better business bureaus, credit
bureaus, and "numerous other groups" reportedly review corporate
purpose clauses through the office of the Secretary of State. 25 Al-

though these organizations have a valid concern for the public interest, it is apparent that the existence of the corporate purpose
clause per se is extraneous to that concern. As mentioned earlier, a
simple request for a copy of the corporation's bylaws provides the
avenue through which access to a corporation's purposes may be
gained. Arguably, the corporation may choose not to cooperate, but
such a line of argument sidesteps the issue. Any complaint that
merits investigation by a consumer advocate will not be resolved
solely through an examination of the purpose clause. It is the illegal nature of specific corporate conduct that is of public concern,
rather than the fact that an act falls outside the scope of the permissible activities delineated in the purpose clause. If any action is
to be taken against a corporation, it will likely be taken because of
illegal, not ultra vires, activities.
Some critics may argue that social reformers conceivably could
find invaluable information in the purpose clause to advance their
causes. They might posit, for example, the following scenario:
M.G., a publicly held corporation that conducts some of its business operations in South Africa, has a purpose clause that contains
limitations on doing business in countries that constantly violate
human rights. The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
(ICCR),2 61 an organization dedicated to social reform, quickly seizes
24 Letter from Allen J. Beerman, Secretary of State of Nebraska to Michael Schaeftler
(June 14, 1982); Letter from Peter P. Harrington, Jr., Assistant Director, Corporations Division of the Office of the Secretary of State of Massachusetts to Michael Schaeftler (October
4, 1982).
25 Letter from Allen J. Beerman, Secretary of State of Nebraska to Michael Schaeftler,
at 2 (June 14, 1982) (discussing proposal to eliminate public filing and amendment requirements in regard to purpose clause); see Letter from Peter P. Harrington, Jr., Assistant Director, Corporations Division of the Office of the Secretary of State of Massachussets to
Michael Schaeftler (October 4, 1982) (contending that "change of purpose" amendments
"provide a clearer description of current corporate activities" for purposes of consumer protection and law enforcement).
25The ICCR has in recent years challenged loans, sales and other business activities of
American corporations in South Africa. See E. HERMAN, CoPxoRATE CoNmoL, CoaPoATE
Powan 270 (1981). Using its status as an institutional investor, the ICCR has sponsored
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the opportunity to purchase enough shares in M.G. to enable ICCR
to raise the threat of a derivative action in order to persuade
M.G.'s executives to cease operations in South Africa. The ICCR
could have acquired the information necessary to obtain this advantage over M.G. as a result of its prior examination of the purpose clauses of the many corporations doing business in South Africa. Once a group such as the ICCR identifies those few
corporations with purpose clause limitations on such activities, it
could most effectively concentrate its efforts and limited resources
on those relatively easy targets. Viewed from this perspective, the
purpose clause filing requirement can be seen as providing a benefit for certain public interest groups and thus for the public at
large.27
The short answer to this argument is that public interest
groups that are not also security holders ought not to have standing to interfere with internal corporate matters. Since the purpose
clause is, in essence, an agreement between the corporation and its
investors, those wishing to keep the corporation within the bounds
of the purpose clause should be shareowners with a vested interest
in corporate profits. What public interest is served by the purpose
clause requirement if that requirement merely aids an activist
group-with no economic stake in the targeted corporation, and
whose complaints should be addressed to the White House or to
Capitol Hill-in selecting the corporation whose management is
most vulnerable to harassment as a method by which it can publicize its social causes? Moreover, such tactics are unlikely to succeed. A company entangled in the web of circumstances described
in the M.G. example would be unlikely to give in to a small new
investor such as the ICCR. Rather, it would attempt to persuade
its other shareholders that the issue of investments in South Africa
resolutions making social responsibility a higher corporate priority at shareholder meetings.
Smith, Church Priorities,Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1980, at 24, col. 3.
"I The benefit can be seen by examining the alternative, and less effective, approach
that would have to be taken to acquire the same amount of influence over corporate behavior if M.G. had no purpose clause limitations on doing business in South Africa. The ICCR
would have to acquire at least $1000 worth of stock in each of the many corporations doing
business in South Africa and then submit a shareholder proposal in the proxy statements of
each of these corporations, requesting termination of such operations. See Amendments to
Rule 14a8, 48 Fed. Reg. 38, 218 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8). Past experience with the proxy machinery indicates that such socially oriented resolutions generally are
supported by less than 5% of the shareholder vote and thus are unlikely to be adopted. See
D. VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION 120-21 (1978).
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is a foreign policy question that should be decided by the State
Department, not by private citizens who sit in corporate boardrooms. It then would be a simple matter for the corporation to
adopt amendments to the purpose clause to repeal any limitations
on investments in South Africa, thus removing the nuisance potential of such actions against management. 8
Furthermore, elimination of the purpose clause requirement
would not adversely affect the ability of shareholders to limit the
scope of corporate activity. Shareholders may still opt to insert in
the bylaws a purpose clause with majority or supermajority voting
requirements for any amendment or change on such clause, if they
so desire.2 This proposal, then, would not preclude minority or
nonofficer shareholders from using a purpose clause to limit management's authority and to protect their interests.
On balance, the costs of filing updated corporate purpose
clauses with a public office outweigh the marginal utility derived
from preserving the status quo. Under the present system, state
employees not only must handle the filing of corporate purpose
clauses and their amendments, but also must make available the
information contained therein at the request of any person or public interest group. Although the monetary cost may be relatively
low, this process imposes bureaucratic and clerical burdens on the
state without generating any tangible benefit for the public. As has
been demonstrated, purpose clauses nowadays are drafted very
broadly. Such clauses delineate all permissible activities in which
the corporation may engage, rather than reveal the specific ventures and business the corporation is in fact pursuing. Tradition
and the proclivity to maintain the status quo account, to a large
extent, for the continued requirements of including a purpose
clause in the certificate and related amendments each time the cor28 In the unlikely situation in which amendments to the purpose clause need approval
by supermajority vote of 99% of the outstanding shares, the ICCR would need to control
only 1% of the shares in order both to veto any legitimization of corporate business activities in South Africa and to force termination of its South African operations. The confluence
of such a supermajority requirement and a suitable purpose clause limitation is so improbable that this possibility offers no real grounds for advocating retention of the purpose clause
requirement.
" The power to alter, amend or repeal a corporation's bylaws, or to adopt a new purpose clause in the bylaws, often is vested in the shareholders by state law unless reserved to
the board in the articles of incorporation. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 4178, at 636 (rev.
perm. ed. 1982).
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poration's purposes change.30 In view of the absence of any compelling reason for retention of the purpose clause in the certificate,
corporate codes should be cleansed by abolishing this requirement.

so It is the author's belief that the request for inspection of the purpose clause is often
made by misinformed lawyers who are unaware of the demise of the ultra vires doctrine.
These lawyers erroneously believe that corporations may be able to avoid transactions entered into with their clients by raising the ultra vires defense. Elimination of the public
filing of the purpose clause will have an educational effect on such members of the bar.
Attorneys approaching the Secretary of State's office with a request to examine the purpose
clause of a certain corporation will be informed that the record no longer accurately reflects
the contents of that corporation's purposes. These attorneys may then realize that the ultra
vires defense has been truly abolished insofar as third parties, unaware of purpose clause
limitations, are concerned.

